Reform Priorities and Risks for Hungary’s New Era

On April 12, 2026, the world watched as Péter Magyar and his Tisza party defeated former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, ending former Orbán’s 16 years in power. The results were widely celebrated as a victory for liberal democracy in Europe, a rebuke to an international far-right alliance, and as a chance to reverse the corruption that characterized Fidesz’s rule. An election that many thought would be close delivered an unprecedented mandate, with Tisza winning over 70% of the seats in Parliament. Magyar’s nominally conservative party built a broad coalition of the electorate from left to right, showing that almost all Hungarians wanted change. This constitutional supermajority opens the door to significant and much-needed reform, but now, as the celebrations end, the hard work begins.

To better understand Hungary’s key anti-corruption priorities, as well as risks to be navigated, I spoke recently with Jozsef Peter Martin, Executive Director of Transparency International Hungary and Andrej Nosko, the Budapest-based Co-Executive Director of Pilnet, an organization that helps nonprofits get expert legal assistance. 

Both Martin and Nosko characterized the election as a regime change, from competitive authoritarianism back to constitutional democracy. Martin in particular referred to the results as “an electoral revolution.” Each said that Magyar’s top priority must be restoring the rule of law, but while performing a delicate balancing act: doing so in a way that itself upholds the rule of law. Magyar needs to act quickly to demonstrate his commitment to integrity, but he also has to avoid the perception that he is simply seeking political revenge. Thus, they emphasized the need for judicial reform first.

As Martin told me, Hungarians expect “punishments as consequences for corruption, as well as the recovery of state assets to the greatest possible extent.” That requires changing leadership positions, such as the chief prosecutors, head of the Supreme Court (Curia) and possibly constitutional judges. These loyalists of the Fidesz regime, he said, need to be replaced by independent and professionally respected figures.

Beyond the judiciary, Magyar has named the heads of other institutions he intends to remove, such as the President, and the heads of the State Audit Office and the Competition Authority. Martin argued that these moves would be legally defensible: those individuals were not serving constitutional or public interests, but rather the needs of Fidesz. He noted that Hungarians will need to demonstrate patience as corruption cases play out in court, trusting that progress is being made. Nosko described this situation as a trilemma: it is difficult to move quickly, ensure transitional justice and respect the rule of law.

Next, the “legalized” corruption that Orbán institutionalized must be challenged on its substance, not just reversed by fiat. As noted, the state will want to recover significant wealth that was systematically transferred into well-connected private and semi-private hands. One example that Nosko shared was the distribution of shares of Hungary's largest energy company to institutions that supported the regime's far-right international network. Nosko told me that though those assets need to be clawed back, they are now largely privately-held, so the process must be carefully managed. Martin told me that in the case of overpriced public procurements, state overpayments need to be documented, with a focus on the recovery of excess rents.

Further, corruption in the Orbán years was a major drain on prosperity, leaving Hungary one of the poorest countries in the EU. As Nosko explained, Magyar will be under pressure to deliver progress on health care, energy, education and infrastructure, while reforming the tax and procurements systems. This means resetting relations with Brussels. Hungary is badly in need of fiscal stimulus, and securing nearly €19 billion in frozen EU funds is a priority, which will require meeting 27 EU reform measures (“milestones” and “super-milestones”). Magyar intends to join the European Public Prosecutor's Office (which Hungary had not previously joined), which holds sway over safeguarding EU funds against fraud. He has also signaled his desire for Hungary to adopt the Euro, which will likely advance key fiscal reforms.

Both Martin and Nosko pointed out that Hungary has the technical expertise and capacity to deliver on all of these aims, as long as sufficient effort is taken to reform key state institutions. But as I discussed with Martin, the NGO sector now faces its own readjustment. Organizations like TI Hungary spent years as watchdogs, and were constantly under pressure and attacked by government offices such as the Sovereignty Protection Office. They are glad to see the end of Orbán, but will take what he termed a “constructively critical” approach under the new government, ensuring the general direction points towards the rule of law and anti-corruption. The media also has a crucial role to play, but first, as Nosko told me, Hungary must restore an independent press, given that Fidesz controlled roughly 80 percent of both state-owned and private media outlets. 

Overall, civil society must manage a delicate shift from adversarial monitoring to constructive criticism, advisory and advocacy. In what Martin called an "optimal situation," there will be agreements and policy disagreements, like in a “normal country.”

Marc Schleifer

Governance, Democracy and Economic Development Expert